The Hard Problem of consciousness

It appears to me that the hard problem of consciousness is a philosophical 'why' question about the existence of the observer. Why is there an observer?

The hard problem if consciousness is stated as-

'why objective, mechanical processing can give rise to subjective experiences.'

If we assume the universe to be a Turing machine, it appears to me that we are basically asking why some of the bits on the tape of some Turing machine also come along with a subjective experience, evidence for which exists in at least one case, one's own.

So, it appears that we are asking why we exist.

In a sense, this question never got addressed by Physics. Physics tells us how to make sense of what we we observe. It never claimed to explain why we exist in the first place. That it assumed as a premise.

Hence, this is the reason why this question is so hard.

In order to answer this question, one will first have to recognize which bit strings of this Turing machine correspond to an observer, and then propose a law that every time such 'conscious' bit strings appear, they will correspond to a subjective experience, whatever it might be.

This will solve the Hard problem.

Definition

The hard problem of consciousness is a concept in philosophy of mind that deals with the question of why and how humans have qualia or phenomenal experiences. It contrasts with the "easy problems" of explaining the physical systems that enable humans and other animals to discriminate, integrate information, etc., which are deemed "easy" because their solutions simply involve specifying the mechanisms that perform these functions. The hard problem persists even if we solve all these "easy" problems about the brain and experience. Essentially, it's about explaining why certain physical processes in the brain give rise to conscious experience, a question that can't be answered simply by detailing these processes or functions.

Elaboration

Suppose that the universe is described by a large Turing Machine. Then, some part of the bit string on the tape of this Turing Machine corresponds to my thoughts. The question is not as to how those bit strings evolve over time to give rise to the evolution of my thoughts. The question is- why am I associated with these bit strings in the first place? Why am I there at all?

I have a first person experience of being associated with this Turing machine. Logically, this need not have been the case. It could had been that the Turing machine was doing its thing, without me being associated with it at all.

So this Turing machine churns out numbers for ages, and suddenly, I come into being. I know I come into being because I have a first person evidence for it.

The question is, what is more fundamental? The bits string of this Turing Machine and 'laws' through which it evolves, or me, the observer, that can conceive these bit strings and how they work.

The reason why the Turing model is lacking is that it fails to explain how this first person observer emerges in association with this Turing machine. The emergence of this observer is not like the emergence of complex behavior from simple laws. The emergence of this observer is a new phenomenon, a new law, that does not follow from the laws of how the bit strings evolve over time.

Why is there an observer? Is this even a scientific question?

In a sense, it would be unfair to ask the Turing model to explain why there is an observer at all. Because, this question is not a scientific question, but a non-scientific philosophical question.

Science is a branch of philosophy, which is distinct from rest of the philosophy in its restriction on what questions can and should be asked and what questions lie beyond its scope. Science is not concerned with the 'why' questions, but the 'how' questions. It is unconcerned about 'why' there is an observer or an observed. This, science assumes as an unquestionable fact. It is more interested in explaining how the 'observed' evolves and 'what' the observer observes.

By restricting the type of questions that can be asked, adopting mathematical rigour and promoting experimental evidence as the final jury in pursuit of truth, science has been able to make enormous progress.

But when we try to apply science to prove that the observer is algorithmic, we may be edging closer to the boundaries of science. And at this stage, the non-scientific philosophical question as to why there is an observer associated with some bit string on the Turing Machine of the universe, may become relevant.

What would a possible solution to the Hard Problem Look like?

It is important to ask this, because if we do not even know what a possible solution to this problem should look like, then perhaps this is an unanswerable question.

For example, I do not know what the theory of everything is. But I can say what such a theory should look like. For example, such a theory would, at the highest level of abstraction, be given by the evolution of a Turing Machine (TM), where the state of the universe is encoded in the data on the tape of this TM.

So, what would a solution to the Hard problem of consciousness look like? Here, I would give it a shot.

Assume the Universe to be well modeled by a Turing Machine (TM), with the data on the tape encoding the current state of the Universe. Then, to solve the hard problem of consciousness, we need a theory that can do the following things-

1. Give a method to (approximately) recognize which bit string on the tape of this Turing Machine are 'conscious'.
2. Propose an extra law that formally associates these 'conscious' bit strings with an entity called 'conscious observer'.
3. Study the different types of subjective experience and their relationship with each other.
4. Study if the conscious observer is just a mute observer or can also have influence on the TM

Some comments-

• Given the state of the universe, it may not be easy to recognize which subsystem is conscious and which is not. For example, I am tempted to say that every time there is a functional brain, then it is conscious, but even AI may become conscious in future, so it is tricky.
• The law that formally associated these 'conscious' bits with entities called 'conscious observers' basically explicitly acknowledges that we live in a Universe which, when modelled by a TM, has extra entities called 'conscious observers' associated with it.
• The theory should define different types of conscious experiences, like sensation of 'redness', 'heat' or 'fear', and study the relationship between these entities.
• If the conscious observer has influence on the TM, is the influence algorithmic? If yes, then it would be equivalent to it having no influence, because any such algorithm can just be incorporated in the original TM. On the other hand, if the influence itself is not algorithmic, then this raises the question- Is the universe well modelled by a TM?